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CONSERVING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
FOR A CONSERVATIVE AGENDA?t 
Samuel Estreicher* 
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM. By Richard A. Pos-
ner. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. xvii, 
365. $25. 
In his new book, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, Judge 
Richard A. Posner, who while on the University of Chicago faculty. 
revolutionized the academic study of law in this country, 1 now takes 
on the cause of the federal courts of appeals. As others have noted, 2 
Judge Posner has really written two books, with the first five chapters 
describing and analyzing an alleged caseload crisis confronting the ap-
peals courts, and the remaining chapters devoted to his views of the 
proper role of federal courts in the making of federal constitutional, 
statutory, and common law. There is no obvious tether connecting the 
two sections, for (aside from a halting attempt in the sixth chapter) 
Judge Posner never explicitly suggests that adoption of his conception 
of the federal judicial process will lessen the burdens on federal appel-
late judges. Perhaps the search for a unitary theme overstates the au-
thor's own objectives, which may simply have been to combine into a 
single volume his recent musings on the federal courts. 
If there is an underlying connective tissue, however, I suspect it 
lies in Judge Posner's concept of "judicial self-restraint." In a widely 
publicized article3 (which re-emerges as the seventh chapter of this 
book), Posner argues that the truly conservative judge owes no partic-
ular fidelity to stare decisis or "strict constructionism" - tenets of 
traditional conservatism. Rather, in cases that admit of no "right an-
swer,"4 the truly conservative judge should opt for those rules that 
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1. See, e.g .• R.A. POSNER, EcoNOMlC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1977). 
2. See, e.g., Monaghan, Taking Bureaucracy Seriously (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 
344 (1985). 
3. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983). 
4. Posner assumes the existence of "an area in which a judge cannot decide cases simply by 
reference to the will of others - legislators, or the judges who decided previous cases, or the 
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m1mmize judicial interference with the decisions of the elected 
branches of government. The caseload explosion, Posner intimates, 
provides an additional reason for adopting the "judicial self-restraint" 
position. Strong medicine is needed, we are told, for clogged appellate 
dockets that threaten to undermine the system's capacity to render 
well-considered, uniform law; procedural tinkering and other "pallia-
tives" will simply not do. What is called for is a "rethinking" of the 
role of federal courts. The unstated thesis of this book seems to be: 
the need to husband or "conserve" federal judicial resources requires a 
truly "conservative" agenda for the federal judiciary. 
Although an immensely interesting effort brimming with informa-
tion and insight, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform is for a 
number of reasons ultimately unsatisfying. First, neither the existence 
of a caseload crisis nor the futility of limited procedural reform is per-
suasively demonstrated. Second, even the more interesting second half 
of the book does not offer a fully elaborated presentation of Posner's 
views on the role of federal courts. Finally, because the author leaves 
unstated the connection between the first five chapters (and part of the 
sixth) and the rest of the book, we either have a book without a unify-
ing thesis or one with a thesis only barely intimated and developed. 
I. Do WE HA VE A CASELOAD CRISIS IN THE 
COURTS OF APPEALS? 
I undertook this review with some trepidation, for I (with John 
Sexton) have explafoed at length elsewhere why the Supreme Court 
faces no workload crisis. 5 A major premise of our study was that the 
responsibility for correction of error in federal cases lies primarily with 
the federal courts of appeals (and state supreme courts), and that these 
courts should also assume a greater role in maintaining a uniform fed-
eral law than in the past. If there is a "crisis" in the federal courts -
certainly, a widespread perception of students of the federal judiciary 
- and we have said it is not at the Supreme Court, then surely it must 
be found in the courts of appeals, if we are not to be held guilty of an 
elaborate "shell" game. 
On one level, the numbers portend a problem of crisis proportions. 
Much as with the literature on the Supreme Court's caseload, the fo-
cus is on the dramatic increase in case filings, which here acquires a 
authors of the Constitution. Within that area, the judge must bring in his own values and prefer-
ences in order to make decisions." Pp. 206-07. This is an "open area 'of judging, where by 
definition a correct decision cannot be made without bringing in personal policy preferences." P. 
207. 
5. See Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An 
Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984). We have recast our study in book form in-
tended for a wider audience, see s. EsrREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME 
COURT: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press, 
forthcoming). 
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particular urgency because we are dealing with courts of mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction. Whereas cases filed in the district courts more 
than tripled from 1960 to 1983, from 80,000 to 280,000, cases dock-
eted at the appellate level during the same period increased eightfold, 
from 3,765 to 25,580 (pp. 63-65). If this trend continues - and the 
combined operation of population gain and new federal laws suggest 
that it will - the surge in filings at the district court level will produce 
a threefold (or, as the late Judge Henry Friendly predicted, a four-
fold6) increase in the appellate caseload. Apparently, the declining 
likelihood of obtaining reversal will not dampen the rate of appeal, for 
appellate dockets have increased during this period despite declining 
reversal rates.7 Given annual growth rates since 1960 of 5.6% in dis-
trict court filings and 9.4% in appeals court filings, Posner projects8 
that by the year 2000 the district court docket will swell to 700,000 
cases and the appellate docket to 136,236 cases (p. 93).9 
The crisis, Posner tells us, is primarily at the appellate level, for 
while the number of district judges can be increased at tolerable cost, 
there is a limit to the system's ability to expand federal appellate ca-
pacity, if the courts of appeals are to remain collegial, reflective bodies 
capable of maintaining a fairly uniform body of law within each cir-
cuit. Without apparent empirical justification, he sets the optimal ap-
peals court size at nine judges, 10 to ensure a credible incidence of 
supervision of panel rulings by the en bane court and, secondarily, to 
preserve an elite position sufficiently prestigious to attract outstanding 
members of the profession. 
For Posner, the crisis is reflected not only in the rise in the average 
number of signed opinions per judge - from thirty-one in 1960 to 
6. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:. A GENERAL VIEW 39 (1973). 
7. Filings in the courts of appeals have risen from 3,765 in 1960 to 25,580 in 1983, despite a 
drop in the reversal rate during the same period from 24.5% to 15.9%. Pp. 68-69. Professor 
Howard's empirical work suggests that circuits with higher rates of appeal tend to exhibit lower 
rates of reversal. See J.W. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: 
A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CIRCUITS 38 (1981). 
8. Posner does qualify this projection: "Of course, these are entirely mechanical extrapola-
tions. Since we do not have a very clear idea of the causes of caseload growth, we cannot predict 
future growth with any confidence." P. 93. This qualification, does not, however, deter Judge 
Posner from continued reliance on the prediction of a caseload crisis in framing the arguments 
made in this book. 
9. Increased filings do not necessarily indicate incremental additions to the appellate judge's 
workload, for the cases may be largely frivolous appeals not meriting extended consideration. See 
note 20 infra and accompanying text. What is needed is a measure of "a case's weighted average 
difficulty" and a corresponding tally of the rate of growth of difficult appeals. See Leventhal, 
Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 UCLA L. REV. 432, 436 
(1976). 
10. Granted, there has been no systematic analysis of the difference between a 9-man and 
an 11-man court (the objection to an even number is obvious), though there is an interesting 
literature on the psychology of small-group interaction that might be consulted .... But the 
fact that no one proposes to enlarge the Supreme Court beyond nine is pretty good evidence 
that a greater number is unwieldy for judicial deliberation. 
P. 100 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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forty-two in 1983 (p. 71) - but more importantly in the increasing 
resort to case-management devices which threaten radically to trans-
form the courts of appeals into relatively unaccountable bureaucracies. 
From judges who do their own work with an acute sense of accounta-
bility not only to their brethren on the court but to the readers of their 
opinions, we are inexorably moving to a world in which decisionmak-
ing is delegated to others - visiting judges, law clerks, or circuit staff 
attorneys - and decisions either are bureaucratic efforts or take the 
form of unpublished memoranda or per curiam rulings not exposed to 
public scrutiny. 
This portrait of crisis, while not inherently implausible, is certainly 
overdrawn and, in some places, entirely speculative. On the face of 
things, an average of forty-two signed opinions a year per judge seems 
quite manageable. This is about twice as many signed opinions as are 
produced on the average by a Supreme Court Justice, who is expected 
to produce fully elaborated pronouncements of national law. By con-
trast, the court of appeals judge decides cases within a more restricted 
domain of precedent (as she is not expected to overrule or reconsider 
Supreme Court law) and normally renders opinions relatively unen-
cumbered by the expectations of solemnity and enduring significance 
that many attach to the ruminations of the High Court. Though a 
modest increase over the 1960 output, forty-two signed opinions a 
year, standing alone, offers no measure of overload unless it can be 
demonstrated that circuit judges were working at full capacity in the 
earlier period. And the examples of Judge Posner and his colleague on 
the Seventh Circuit, Frank Easterbrook, as well as those of Judges Jon 
Newman and Ralph Winter on the Second Circuit and Harry Ed-
wards, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Ginsburg, Patricia Wald, and Robert 
Bork on the D.C. Circuit (a court that daily deals with quite compli-
cated regulatory cases), suggest that time may be available for 
speeches, legal scholarship, and some part-time teaching. 11 
Judge Posner wisely premises the overload argument on other indi-
cia: the increasing use of visiting judges and the accompanying pros-
pect of inconsistent law within the same circuit; the expansion in the 
number of "elbow clerks" and other substitute decisionmakers; and 
the apparently surging propensity to dispose of ever-larger portions of 
the appellate docket by unpublished memoranda or per curiam opin-
ions. These developments, Posner warns, portend a future in which 
appeals judges will not be able to supervise meaningfully the district 
courts while ensuring consistent law within the circuit and producing 
opinions with a high level of craftsmanship. 
11. Certainly, if judges have the time they should be encouraged to engage in such activities, 
which provide intellectual replenishment and an important service to the legal community. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that some of our most highly regarded judges do find the time for these worth· 
while pursuits suggests that perhaps appellate dockets are not quite as pressing as Judge Posner 
suggests. 
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Posner has identified important problems that deserve further 
study, but the picture may not be as gloomy as the one he has painted. 
The literature he cites on the use of visiting judges12 and intracircuit 
inconsistency13 is largely impressionistic and spotty; one finds no con-
clusive demonstration that such inconsistency regularly occurs, or in-
deed that the situation has worsened over the last quarter of a century. 
It is a characteristic of this book that Posner fails to explore in any 
serious way the possibility that incremental reforms might alleviate 
whatever problem is thought to exist. Apparently, some circuits have 
taken steps to review the selection of visiting judges as a means of 
maintaining quality control.14 The infrequency of en bane considera-
tion in most circuits does suggest that, to an undesirable extent, ad hoc 
three-member panels operate with little accountability to the circuit as 
a whole. Here, too, there are steps that can be taken short of major 
surgery. The practice followed in some circuits of circulating panel 
rulings before they are handed down should be required in all circuits. 
As John Sexton and I propose in our forthcoming book, 15 procedures 
could be developed to enable parties complaining of a panel ruling that 
has created a conflict within the circuit to seek rehearing not by the 
same panel but rather by a sitting motions panel or an entirely new 
panel. Lawyers in the office of the circuit executive might also be 
charged with the responsibility of screening such complaints for re-
hearing by the second panel. Whatever the merits of these ideas, it is 
plain that Posner assumes the existence of a problem of crisis propor-
tions without convincing proof, and shows only passing interest in 
evaluating reforms that would not require radical restructuring of the 
system. 
The same can be said about the use of law clerks and reliance on 
12. As Posner acknowledges, the only empirical study cited on the use of visiting judges 
reports no decline in quality of decisionmaking. Seep. 101 & nn.S-6 (discussing Green & Atkins, 
Designated Judges: How Well Do They Perform?, 61 JUDICATURE 358 (1978)). As for the ex-
tent of reliance on such judges, Posner found by sampling from reported decisions that visiting 
judges sat on 31% of the panels in 1983, compared to 22% in 1960. Emulating Posner's method-
ology, I looked at the reported decisions in volume 763 of the Federal Reporter, 2d (1985), and 
found that 52 of 145, or 35.8%, of the reported decisions involved the participation of judges 
sitting by designation; by contrast, less than five percent of the reported decisions in volume 342 
of the Federal Reporter, 2d (1965), involved the use of such judges. In my 1985 s~ple, I found 
only five split decisions involving the participation of such judges, three of which were dissents 
from the panel decisions - a finding consistent with Green & Atkins, supra, at 369. 
13. The only citation offered by Posner is Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States Courts of 
Appeals: Dimensio11s and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1343 (1979), which 
offers a few examples of inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit. This unwieldly court of appeals 
having 28 active judges may also be a special case. See note 23 infra and accompanying text. 
14. Chief Judge Feinberg of the Second Circuit reports that he personally decides who may 
serve as a visiting judge, and that, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(a) & 292(d), he must present a "certifi-
cate of necessity" and secure the approval of the Chief Justice of the United States before he can 
utilize judges from outside the circuit. See Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge ofa Federal Court 
of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 370, 380 (1984). 
IS. See S. EsTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 5. 
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unpublished opinions. Discounting for any myopia to which I may 
have fallen prey as a law clerk, I find unpersuasive the "judicial bu-
reaucracy" literature16 to which Posner adverts, which equates the law 
clerk phenomenon with an emerging bureaucratic style of opinion 
writing. True, many opinions of federal judges suffer from a deadly 
style and surfeit of footnotes. Law clerks, typically unseasoned law-
yers, are partially to blame; the availability of word processors and 
computerized legal research also may be culpable. 
Before these stylistic problems can be ascribed to a presumably 
crushing workload, one must demonstrate that the situation was in-
deed better in earlier times, when appeals judges faced less demanding 
dockets. My impressionistic sense of the opinions in the Federal Re-
porter volumes of the 1950s and early 1960s is that, with relatively few 
exceptions, they were shorter in length but also perceptibly short of 
analysis and explication. 
I suspect that given the usual criteria of judicial appointment, few 
chosen for article III status are consummate masters of the art of opin-
ion writing. The likes of Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, and Harold 
Leventhal are few and far between in any era. Typically, appointees to 
the federal bench come from the ranks of senior partners in law firms 
or holders of important elective or appointive government positions, 
who long ago lost the knack or taste for writing first drafts and who 
find congenial the availability of bright, recent law graduates capable 
of generating editable, well-researched first drafts. Indeed, even if the 
federal appellate caseload were halved, one should expect no dramatic 
change in the style of opinions or the extent of footnoting. 
The data on the extent to which cases are decided per curiam or by 
unpublished opinions appears somewhat more troubling.17 Here, too, 
Judge Posner cannot say that the present situation is terribly different 
16. See, e.g., J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986); Vining, 
Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 (1981). 
17. Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit reports that in the twelve months preceding 
June 30, 1982, 46% of the 23, 760 appeals terminated in the federal courts of appeals were dis-
posed of without oral argument or submission of briefs; and in 54% of those cases, with no 
statement of reasons whatsoever. See Edwards, The Rising Workload and Perceived "Bureau-
cracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Reme-
dies, 68 low AL. REv. 871, 894 (1983). His colleague, Judge Patricia Wald, similarly reports 
that in 1982, 51.2% of the D.C. Circuit's dispositions were by order or judgment accompanied by 
brief unpublished statements. See Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureau-
cracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 Mo. L. REV. 766, 782 n.38 (1983). 
The literature on unpublished appellate opinions is extensive, critical, and largely unil-
luminating. See, e.g., Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. 
J. 405 (1981); Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States 
Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981) [hereinafter cited as A11 
Evaluation of Limited Publication]; Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807; Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precede11tial Precede/II -
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1167 (1978). 
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from the "one-liner" practice of the past. 18 Certainly, the single right 
of appeal provided by the federal system must ring hollow to litigants 
who learn that their carefully wrought objections to the judgment be-
lQw have been rejected without even the solace of a statement of rea-
sons. It was in part the desire to give the parties some statement of 
reasons in cases previously disposed of by unilluminating one-liners 
that led many of the circuits to authorize disposition by unpublished 
memoranda that may not serve as precedent in future cases. Judge 
Posner is certainly correct that some undetermined number of these 
cases merits a full-fl.edged opinion that would benefit from the ac-
countability inherent in openly announcing law of the circuit, and that 
requiring publication in all cases is impossible under current (and 
maybe past) caseloads. 
One must question, however, Posner's apparent premise that uni-
versal publication is necessarily a good thing because it will add to the 
existing "stock of precedents."19 Other than the specious allure of the 
market analogy, it is not clear that publishing opinions in the over-
whelming percentage of cases presently disposed of by unpublished 
memorandum or one-liner would be a useful expenditure of anyone's 
time and energy. Appeals courts decide essentially two different types 
of cases: one calling simply for resolution of a narrow, often fact-spe-
cific dispute of little interest to anyone other than the immediate par-
ties; the other requiring a ruling on some unsettled point oflaw. For 
the former, a statement of reasons in the form of an unpublished mem-
orandum that is circulated to the full court and is available to the 
public suffices to ensure a responsible decision; there is no useful law-
declaration, exegetical function in requiring publication. Full-blown 
opinions constituting binding precedent are necessary only for the lat-
ter category of cases, where the judge's role is not only to explain the 
exercise of power but also guide the development of the law. Yet, 
neither Posner nor the authorities he cites has shown that the courts of 
appeals are failing to meet their responsibilities in those cases. Based 
on my experience as a law clerk on the D.C. Circuit in 1975-1976, I 
suspect that aside from plainly frivolous appeals, the lion's share of 
summary dispositions occurs in cases in which the issue involves the 
application of settled circuit law to particular facts, or in which ap-
peals court review is only one additional check on a decision that al-
ready has been exposed to extensive, possibly multi-tiered review, as 
would be true of administrative agency adjudicatory proceedings.20 
18. Neither Posner nor Professors Reynolds and Richman, supra note 17, attempt such a 
comparison. 
19. See, e.g., pp. 125-26. 
20. See Leventhal, supra note 9, at 441 ("Summary dispositions without printed opinions, 
which account for over half of our court's disposition after consideration, may be used wisely and 
properly. They expedite the process and help delay the swelling of law libraries. . . . It bears 
repetition that summary dispositions, preferably with some citation or indication of reasons, for 
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Moreover, it remains to be demonstrated that even if there were time 
to write published opinions in all cases, more decisional law in such 
cases would necessarily promote predictability or doctrinal coherence. 
Indeed, the converse may be true, for more opinions may create new 
points of divergence and yet additional pleas for harmonization. This 
may be a situation in which, contrary to Posner's usual 
microeconomic assumptions, there is a law of diminishing returns: 
more is not necessarily better. 
The fifth chapter, entitled "Palliatives," rounds out the portrait of 
a system in crisis. Here, Judge Posner offers a number of interesting 
suggestions - experimentation with modest district court filing fees 
and imposing attorneys' fees on losing parties - as well as the old 
standby, abolition or limitation of diversity jurisdiction (by raising the 
amount-in-controversy requirement to $50,000 and restricting federal-
court access to nonresidents of the forum state).21 But as these meas-
ures can at best provide only modest relief, he goes on to evaluate 
proposals for more fundamental change. Specialized federal courts of 
appeals offer the promise of diverting cases away from the circuit 
courts. Except for areas of limited public controversy such as tax law, 
Posner argues that they are distinctly less desirable than courts staffed 
by generalist judges, who are likely to be more faithful to the original 
spirit of the laws and less likely to be the captive of interest groups 
ascendant at a particular time. It would be better, he urges, to 
strengthen the appellate process within the agencies themselves.22 As 
for proposals for a national court of appeals, which conceivably might 
the bulk of cases infers that opinion time can be devoted to cases that really require extended 
reflection and analysis."). 
Even Reynolds and Richman, though critics of limited publication, "discovered no wide-
spread 'hiding' of Jaw-declaring opinions": "Although non publication of Jaw-declaring opinions 
does occur, our review of the opinions in our sample has convinced us that it is not a major 
problem with limited publication. The handful of examples we discovered constituted less than 
1% of the nearly 900 opinions in our sample." See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of 
Limited Publication, supra note 17, at 608, 609. 
21. Apparently, diversity cases are relatively time-consuming and difficult to process on the 
district-court level, but they represent relatively easy cases to dispose of on appeal, usually with-
out need of a published opinion. Hence, Posner suggests, eliminating diversity jurisdiction would 
cut 20% of the district courts' caseload, but "might have a smaller impact on the workload of the 
courts of appeals than is implied by the fact that 14 percent of the cases appealed to those courts 
in 1983 were diversity cases." P. 139. 
22. Posner urges curtailment of federal appellate review of agency adjudications that already 
have been subject to internal agency review (pp. 161-62), a proposal difficult to square with his 
opposition to specialized federal courts of appeals (pp. 147-60) and his acknowledgment that 
agency review "very often is performed in so perfunctory and unconvincing a manner that the 
review has little credibility with many federal judges and has to be repeated by them." P. 161. 
The integrity of agency adjudications, in my view, depends on the existence of federal court 
oversight, even if this rarely results in published opinions. Judge Friendly's more limited 1973 
proposal preserved "one judicial look at the action of a disinterested governmental agency." He 
recommended that where review of agency action lies in the district court and the district court 
has affirmed, further review by the court of appeals would be possible only by leave of that court. 
See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 176. 
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provide a means of supervising ad hoc circuit panels and promoting 
greater uniformity of federal law, we are told that this cure for in-
tercircuit conflicts would not itself stem the flood of appellate cases, 
and would, moreover, eliminate desirable competition among the cir-
cuits in the formulation of rules of national law (pp. 162-66). 
II. PROPOSALS FOR THE CIRCUITS IN CRISIS 
Having demonstrated the crisis and exposed conventional reforms 
as "palliatives," Judge Posner opens his sixth chapter: 
The difficulty of solving the federal courts' caseload problems by the 
measures considered in the last chapter invites a different kind of ap-
proach ... - a more general reconsideration of the federal judicial pro-
cess. Of course, such reconsideration may have value apart from its 
contribution to alleviating the caseload crisis; but the crisis gives this 
kind of fundamental analysis an urgency it would otherwise lack. [p. 
169] 
What unifies the proposals Posner is willing to take up as part of this 
"more general reconsideration" (apart from some useful suggestions in 
Chapter Eight for promoting a greater sense of institutional responsi-
bility among circuit judges) is that they involve either reducing the 
role of federal courts in administering federal law or reducing the role 
of federal law. 
Caseload reduction is a rather odd basis for a radical redistribution 
of the respective roles of federal and state courts or for major changes 
in federal substantive law. Such measures would seem weakly justified 
by caseload considerations alone. At the very least, one would require 
a more powerful demonstration of the existence of a crisis than Posner 
has ventured to offer. Even then, as Owen Fiss has asked, if the sys-
tem is really in danger of overload, is it not the better course to add 
circuit judges (and, possibly, split up further the existing circuits in 
order to facilitate rehearing by the en bane court)?23 Would, say, a 
doubling of the existing circuit judgeships so cheapen the coin24 that 
men and women of distinction would not be attracted to the federal 
bench? 
Even on its own terms, Judge Posner's "more general reconsidera-
tion" offers little, if any, caseload relief. In Chapter Six, he subjects 
virtually all of federal law to an "economic federalism" test. He finds 
23. See Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1463-64 (1983) (in-
creasing the number of judges may dilute institutional responsibility but preserves individual 
responsibility for decisionmaking); H. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 41 & n.131 (arguments against 
single-state circuits are not particularly compelling, for the chief virtue is political not geographic 
diversity). 
24. This is Justice Rehnquist's metaphor. See Rehnquist, Are the True Old Times Dead? 
(Mac Swinford Lecture at the University of Kentucky, Sept. 23, 1982), cited in Ginsburg, Reflec-
tions on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1, 10-11 (1983). 
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that federalization of the law has occurred - in areas such as bank 
fraud and civil rights - despite the absence of any danger of states 
discriminating against nonresidents or otherwise imposing not fully in-
ternalized costs on out-of-state actors - what Posner calls "interstate 
spillovers" or "externalities." Applying a similar test for determining 
whether the federal courts have to be involved in the enforcement of 
federal law, he finds that state courts can be relied upon to enforce 
vigorously federal concerns having counterparts in familiar common 
law concepts (e.g., federal fraud crimes), federal rules that seek to fer-
ret out innocence in criminal prosecutions, and federal norms that 
protect the civil rights of individuals who enjoy competitive access to 
the state political system (e.g., procedural due process claims by state 
employees and age discrimination suits). Yet, even "[i]f the theory 
were applied rigorously, perhaps 20 percent of the federal district 
courts' cases, and 21 percent of the courts of appeals' cases, would be 
reassigned to the state courts. The resulting relief of federal caseload 
pressures, though welcome, would only postpone the ultimate crisis a 
few years" (p. 189). Moreover, Posner acknowledges, a rigorous ap-
plication of "economic federalism" might even argue for expansion of 
federal responsibility over certain areas now left wholly to the states, 
such as product liability suits against interstate manufacturers and 
· distributors. 
There are additional problems with the "economic federalism" ap-
proach. One is the obvious difficulty of any reform proposal that 
spells relief for the federal courts at the expense of state courts which 
face even more demanding dockets.25 Posner's answer is candidly elit-
ist: any accretion to state dockets will not detract significantly from 
the quality of decisionmaking by state courts because (i) state systems 
are larger and can absorb these additional federal cases, and (ii) "at-
tending to the quality of the federal court system is a more urgent 
priority than attending to the quality of the state systems - which 
anyway is something that only the states can do effectively" (pp. 134-
35). 
On the doubtful assumption that state courts would not be terribly 
burdened by the proposed reallocation of responsibility, Posner slights 
some of the other important reasons for making federal courts princi-
pally responsible for the enforcement of federal laws. Federal rights 
necessarily displace state regulation and, certainly with respect to the 
civil rights statutes which Posner identifies as prime candidates for di-
version to the state courts, they impose norms that may be politically 
unpopular in the locality or that impose costs on actors - such' as 
private businesses or state governments - who may be particularly 
25. See, e.g., Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simp/ijicatio11, 42 Mo. L. REV. 
659, 674-75 (1983) (abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction should be accompanied by corre-
sponding tradeoff limiting state responsibility for enforcement of federal rights). 
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influential in the area. Federal courts staffed by individuals enjoying 
lifetime tenure are inevitably going to be more receptive to the asser-
tion of claims based on such rights. Federal courts are also more 
likely to be familiar with federal law, conditioned to viewing federal 
law as a unitary system, and hence more attentive to pronouncements 
in other circuits. Indeed, adoption of Posner's approach would create 
considerable pressure on the Supreme Court to police actively the ad-
ministration of federal law in state courts, diverting it from its more 
central lawmaking function - perhaps ultimately requiring a national 
court of appeals, which Posner opposes. 
The coda to Chapter Six ("Federalism and Substantive Due Pro-
cess") and all of Chapter Seven give us Posner's views on reducing the 
role of federal courts in constitutional adjudication. The theme here is 
·''judicial self-restraint": in cases of "open texture," where the avail-
able decisional materials yield no "right answer," the judge who truly 
believes in self-restraint will defer to the decisions of the politically 
accountable branches. Posner never clearly comes out and says that 
judicial self-restraint, so understood, is always the right approach, and 
thus never really mounts a defense of it. Indeed, he seems somewhat 
ambivalent, arguing at times that "judicial self-restraint is a contin-
gent, a time-and-place-bound, rather than an absolute good" (p. 211); 
arguments based on the undemocratic character of the judiciary do 
not justify deference; and, indeed, "restraint is only one factor in re-
sponsible judicial decision making" (p. 220), for truly great judges like 
Oliver Wendell Holmes showed greatness in their responsiveness to 
"the big ideas" of their time (p. 222). 
It is difficult to come away with very much from this discussion, 
other than a definitional advance over more traditional views of "self-
restraint" that were premised on respect for stare decisis and notions 
of strict constructionism. As a theory for what courts should do in 
hard cases, it is incomplete and, in its present form, unpersuasive. 
Posner concedes that the framers of the Constitution wanted "a 
nondemocratic branch" to police the democratic legislature (pp. 212-
13), that the Constitution contains several openly textured provisions 
which require judges to exercise discretion rather than decide cases 
"simply by reference to the will of others" (pp. 206-07), and that other 
reasons conventionally given for deference, flowing from considera-
tions of institutional competence, carry little weight. Yet, Posner 
never really tells us why self-restraint in his separation-of-powers sense 
is the preferred approach, save where judges are permitted to bring 
wayward legislatures and executives into conformity with the "big 
ideas" of the age. The reason cannot be political conservatism in the 
usual sense, for, as exemplified by the writings of his former colleague, 
Richard Epstein, a political agenda would argue for activist enforce-
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ment of particular norms.26 
I suspect - and it is only a suspicion, for Judge Posner does not 
come and say it in so many words - that the caseload crisis is being 
offered as an unstated yet powerful additional reason for self-restraint. 
An overburdened federal judiciary should not make more work for 
itself by overriding the actions of the politically accountable branches 
in "open texture" cases; restraint thus not only advances separation-
of-powers values but also frees up the docket. If so, we are being of-
fered a peculiarly weak argument for reading the fundamental text of 
our society in a particular way. We are also not likely to make much 
of a dent in the purported caseload crisis. 
III. POSNER'S MUSINGS ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CRAFT: THE 
CASE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The remainder of the book has even less to do with relieving appel-
late dockets. Rather, these chapters present Judge Posner's views on 
the proper way to read statutes and the Constitution. He assumes that 
his proposals have been adopted and the caseload crisis has subsided: 
If the proposals advanced in Chapters 5 through 8 were adopted, we 
would be some way toward solving the federal court's caseload crisis; it 
would then be possible to move on to those problems that would exist 
even if the caseload pressures were no greater today than they were 25 
years ago. [p. 261] 
Time and space do not permit a discussion of all that is interesting in 
these concluding chapters. My focus will be on Posner's view of the 
judge in statutory cases. 
On one level, Posner adopts an "interest-group" conception of the 
legislative process, similar to that of his colleague Frank Easter-
brook. 27 He is quite skeptical of the ability or desire of legislators to 
promote the public interest, other than as a serendipitous by-product 
of political logrolling. Departing from the Pound-Landis schoo1,2s he 
states that courts are wise not to reason from one statute to another, 
"if a realistic view of the legislative process is taken" (p. 268); that 
resort to legislative history should go no further than statements of the 
sponsors' intentions; and that generally private rights of action should 
not be judicially implied, for often the legislative compromise involves 
26. See, e.g., R.A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMl!llENT 
DOMAIN (1985); see also B.H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). 
27. See Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1984); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). Easterbrook's writings 
are much influenced by the work of George Stigler. See G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE 
STATE: EssAYS ON REGULATION (1975); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
EcON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
28. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 213 (1934); 
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); Pound, Common 
Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). 
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the deliberate creation of rights without effective enforcement mecha-
nisms. In a particularly effective discussion, he urges disregard of 
many of the conventional canons of construction, because they impute 
an unrealistic rationality to the legislative process. Like Easterbrook's 
writings, this approach supports strict constructionism for statutes. 
As the product of legislatures is no more than compromises between 
competing interest groups, the job of the courts is simply to implement 
the deal that was struck and to go no further. 
Posner's views, on further reflection, appear to be more textured, 
more sophisticated than Easterbrook's. In categorizing statutes, he is 
willing to find that statutes might be directed to the "public interest" 
not only in the economic sense but also "in terms of some widely-held 
conception of the just distribution of wealth" (p. 265), as in the case of 
progressive taxation; and some statutes of the "public sentiment" vari-
ety may ultimately be found in the public interest but cannot now "be 
justified on economic or conventional equity grounds, but perhaps 
only because not enough is known about [their] consequences" (p. 
266). 
More significantly, in offering his alternative to interpretation 
based on canons of construction, Posner seems to be suggesting some-
thing akin to the Hart-Sacks Legal Process school. 29 The first stage 
for Posner is "the method of imaginative reconstruction": "the judge 
should try to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and 
figure out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case 
before him" (pp. 286-87). If this method fails to yield a clear answer, 
the second stage asks the judge to come up with "the most reasonable 
result in the case at hand - always bearing in mind that what seems 
reasonable to the judge may not have seemed reasonable to the legisla-
tors, and that it is their conception of reasonableness, to the extent 
known, rather than the judge's, that should guide decision" (p. 287). 
Despite the "obvious affinities" between his methodology and the 
Hart-Sacks "attribution of purpose" approach (p. 288), Posner cau-
tions that his point of departure is to recognize the role of "interest 
groups, popular ignorance and prejudice" and urge the judge to follow 
the lines of the legislative compromise, if discernible - in short, "to 
implement not the purposes of one group of legislators but the com-
promise itself" (pp. 288-89). 
Judge Posner is certainly a more muted critic of the legislative pro-
cess than Professor Posner.30 His present views, though more appro-
priate to the judge's modest office, are difficult to square with the 
"interest group" model of legislation that he otherwise espouses. If 
statutes are no more than political logrolling, why should judges en-
gage at all in "imaginative reconstruction"? And certainly when this 
29. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1144-74 (1958) (unpublished). 
30. Compare R.A. POSNER, supra note l, at 408-17. 
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technique fails to provide an answer, should not the judge who takes a 
"realistic" view of the process simply declare that the case is beyond 
the "statute's domain," rather than attempt to come up with a "rea-
sonable result," which presumably was no concern of the legislators in 
the first place? 
There may be here the seeds of an interesting reconception of the 
legislative process - one that better reflects the fuzzy interplay of "in-
terest group" pressures and "public interest" aspirations which in-
forms most legislation, and one that assigns to judges a role that 
maximizes the influence of the latter.31 But the discussion is too sum-
mary and too uncritical of "interest group" premises- ultimately, the 
reader is left in the dark. 
Given the book's overall theme, it is also surprising that Posner 
does not explain how the caseload crisis should inform the process of 
statutory interpretation. This would seem an obvious place to have 
attempted a linkage between the two books he has written, yet we are 
left only with questions. For example, should the securities laws be 
construed to reach instances of fraud not directly affecting the opera-
tion of markets, where such a reading will create additional work for 
federal courts?32 How should courts deal with claims for extending 
avowed "public interest" measures that delegate decisionmaking to, 
and measurably expand the business of, the federal courts, such as the 
Sherman Act33 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983?34 Are caseload considerations 
ever an appropriate basis for declining to extend a statute's reach? 
In sum, Judge Posner does not deliver on the book's subtitle: the 
"crisis" in the courts of appeals is unproven, and the "reform" offered 
has little to do with ameliorating the crisis. Posner has written a prob-
ing work on the "federal courts," but one lacking a coherent thesis on 
the proper role of courts in federal constitutional, statutory, and com-
mon law cases. 
31. For an interesting recent attempt, see Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode/, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). 
32. See, e.g., Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., 75 I F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1985) (applica-
tion of antifraud provisions of securities laws to employment disputes). 
33. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 
(1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See generally 
Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986). 
34. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
